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Introduction
No education grantmaker can afford to ignore
public policy. Local, state and federal policies
shape the context in which we work by establish-
ing education standards, allocating resources
and setting priorities for people working in
education.” So begins the report on Grantmakers
for Educations’s 2005 Grantmakers Institute,
Foundation Strategies for Influencing Education
Policy. The statement rings more true than ever. 
“
ven funders that choose to steer clear
of public policy grantmaking must do
so with an understanding that their work will
almost certainly be influenced by shifts in the
policy environment. This reality will persist as
long as American schools and colleges continue
to suffer the effects of the economic crisis,
cities and states look for ways to stimulate sig-
nificant educational improvements, and states
step up to participate in new federal policy ini-
tiatives and to meet the challenges of prepar-
ing students for the global economy.
Building on its 2005 examination of the proce-
dural and legal strategies funders need to con-
sider for engaging with policy, GFE convened
grantmakers from around the country in
Cambridge, Mass., in May 2009. Through a
series of discussions with education leaders and
faculty members from Harvard University’s
Graduate School of Education and John F.
Kennedy School of Government, Institute par-
ticipants deepened their understanding of suc-
cesses, opportunities and challenges in public
policy grantmaking.
Robert Schwartz opened the 2009 Education
Grantmakers Institute by reminding the partic-
ipants of a quotation by F. Scott Fitzgerald.
“The test of a first-rate intelligence,” Fitzgerald
wrote in his 1936 essay “The Crack-Up,” “is the
ability to hold two opposed ideas in the mind
at the same time and still retain the ability to
function.” For education grantmakers today,
especially those supporting public policy
change, the opposed ideas are the worldwide
economic crisis and the emerging sense of
possibility that real improvement in American
education is attainable. 
The optimism of the current moment stems in
part from the willingness of the Obama
Administration to place education at the fore-
front of policy change and federal spending.
But the new mood also emanates from the
school reform movement itself, and the palpa-
ble sense that education reform is becoming
“unstuck.” The promise of profound policy
change is in the air, and grantmakers are play-
ing an instrumental role in areas as diverse as
improving community colleges, introducing
new common academic standards for the
nation’s K-12 schools and significantly expand-
ing early education.
This is a hopeful time, and an appropriate one
for thinking strategically about what can be
done to improve the public policies that inform
American education, how policies can be imple-
mented in practice, and which roles different
actors (including grantmakers) can play in
bringing about needed improvements in both
realms. The Institute featured lively discussions
as participants and faculty members explored
the complexities of these issues. This report
reflects the insights that came out of those
conversations, as well as the sense of urgency
the participants brought to their learning. 
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The promise of profound policy 
change is in the air, and grantmakers 
are playing an instrumental role.
PART 1
Opportunities and pitfalls
in public policy grantmaking
For a grantmaker, the decision to get involved
with public policy change requires answering
some preliminary questions: What are the reali-
ties of the current environment? What are our
objectives and underlying assumptions? And
what are the risks and challenges of being a pri-
vate actor in the public policy domain?
he Institute began with a discussion of
those questions considered in the con-
text of an historical case study, “The Carnegie
Foundation and the Standardized Testing
Movement.” This study examines the role of the
Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of
Teaching in the creation of the Educational
Testing Service (ETS) during the decades
before and after World War II. Concerned that
the quality of American higher education might
drop as the nation’s colleges absorbed an influx
of underprepared students, the foundation
championed the development of a common
placement exam——a step, some believed, toward
guaranteeing the rigor of the high school cur-
riculum in schools across the country. 
A complex story, the case weaves together the
foundation’s long-standing involvement in
American higher education and the policy
pressures of a period in which high school
attendance was expanding rapidly and placing
new demands on private colleges. The case
also offers a detailed account of the specific
moves made by the foundation to capitalize on
a particular moment of opportunity and paints
a vivid picture of the interests, hostilities and
loyalties that motivated the major characters. 
In other words, despite the passage of roughly
60 years, the story of the Carnegie Foundation’s
involvement with public policy has many of the
same ingredients that today’s grantmakers
find when they work in the policy arena. The
sharpest and most relevant lessons have to do
with setting goals, understanding the policy
context, and managing one’s own role and that
of the foundation in a complex environment.
These include:
• Insularity is a danger if you don’t vet 
your assumptions carefully. Calling the
study a “cautionary tale,” one grantmaker
pointed to the importance of vetting your
own assumptions rigorously and consider-
ing alternative points of view. “Insularity
was a problem for them,” he concluded.
That insularity contributed to the creation
of a testing system that perpetuated the
social stratification of American society,
some participants argued, rather than 
ameliorating or challenging it. “This case 
is about what happens when you inject 
private values into public processes,” said
one, arguing that the foundation “assumed
a certain model of education that many
people did not share.” 
• A project doesn’t need to be about policy
to have policy implications——and some-
times the implications are significant.
The Carnegie Foundation did not set out
explicitly to create a national test; rather, 
it simply sided consistently with a particular
faction in the standardized testing debate——
a faction that represented elite interests 
in American higher education and had a
stake in protecting what it saw as the high
standards of a traditional college education.
By lending its support to an already power-
ful constituency, the foundation added
weight to a movement that had implications
far beyond the immediate context.
T
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The sharpest and most relevant lessons have to
do with setting goals, understanding the policy
context, and managing one’s own role and that
of the foundation in a complex environment.
• Personality conflicts and competitiveness
can drive policy debates and sometimes
distort them. Nothing in the Carnegie
Foundation case suggests that any of the
parties was acting in bad faith; in all likeli-
hood, they were genuinely trying to estab-
lish a fair and rational system for connecting
colleges with qualified students. Yet, as the
case makes clear, the debate was fueled
throughout, and perhaps driven off course,
by complex personal and institutional ani-
mosities and loyalties that were not always
readily apparent.
• Policy formation is not a particularly
objective or democratic process, and the
boundaries of ethical involvement are not
always clear. More than once, participants
noted, the Carnegie Foundation decided at 
a crucial moment to “buy” a decision——once
by arranging for a competitor of ETS to go
out of business. Some thought this consti-
tuted a clear breach of ethical standards.
Others objected: “Come on!” interjected
one. “We all buy decisions. The bottom line
is, they hit the target.”
• Solutions in one area can raise new chal-
lenges in another. In seeking to address 
one set of problems——the lack of academic
standards in American high school educa-
tion and the danger that underprepared 
students would compromise the quality of
American private colleges——the foundation
helped to craft a solution that contributed
to a different, and perhaps more serious,
problem: persistent disparities in college
access among American students. “Broad
access to higher education was not a priori-
ty at the time. Access was not the problem
they were trying to solve,” one person
6
Philanthropy and
education policy 
1940S AND TODAY:
What’s the same? What’s different?
The Carnegie Foundation case discussion
wrapped up with a brainstorming session
about what’s similar and what’s different
about being a grantmaker working in 
education policy then and now.
What’s similar: 
• Tendency inside foundations to think
they know what’s best
• Use of philanthropic power or money 
to buy decisions
• Importance of relationships if you 
want to make change
• Lack of rigor in inspecting the idea 
and testing it against data
What’s different: 
• Explicit value placed today on broad
engagement and a diversity of voices
• Increased availability of research 
and data 
• Many more players (especially among
foundations) working in the policy
arena, and a tendency among them to
scrutinize and challenge one another
• Increased magnitude and scale: more
students, more educational institutions,
more regulation
• Greater oversight and transparency, in
part because of easier communication
Scrutiny and accountability, in combination
with an engaged, thoughtful process,
can ultimately yield powerful results.
noted during the discussion. “And the SATs
did open up access to some students,” said
another. But what might have happened,
one person wondered, if public universities
had been included in the process? Might
they have anticipated the access problem
and helped to forestall it?
• Be careful what you wish for. Whether 
the Carnegie Foundation saw it coming 
or not, standardized testing has created 
barriers to higher education for many 
students. “That’s the risk of getting into 
policy,” one participant said. “If you push for
policy change, and you’re as successful as
these people were, then you may find that
you’ve screwed things up royally.” 
You may think you’re being objective, he
went on, but “all foundations come with 
a set of values. Unless we’re questioning
those values, and examining how they
inform our goals, then we’re dangerous.”
esting and college admissions were light-
ly regulated in the 1940s, and the
Carnegie Foundation therefore had significant
scope to influence the field. Today, the stan-
dards and testing landscape is far more com-
plex, and it is hard to imagine a foundation
operating with such a degree of latitude.
Nevertheless, comparable opportunities may
still exist——arenas where funders could push
widespread changes without getting lost in a
thicket of existing practice, or where the devel-
opment of a pivotal new tool or model could
have broad implications. Foundations today are
more heavily scrutinized and the ethic of public
accountability is much stronger than was the
case for the Carnegie Foundation at that time.
But scrutiny and accountability, in combination
with an engaged, thoughtful process, can ulti-
mately yield powerful results, without the pit-
falls underscored by the case study.
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Foundations and 
Public Policy Grantmaking
As preparation for the Institute, participants read this white paper by 
Julia Coffman, commissioned by the James Irvine Foundation, available at 
http://www.irvine.org/assets/pdf/pubs/philanthropy/PublicPolicy_Coffman.pdf.
In this paper, Coffman proposes a useful framework to guide grantmakers as
they develop public policy strategy, identifying more than 20 activities that con-
stitute key policy grantmaking approaches. The framework arrays these activi-
ties along two strategic dimensions: the audiences the funder is trying to
influence and the outcomes it seeks to achieve with those audiences in order to
advance a policy goal. In her analysis, Coffman emphasizes the wide range of
options grantmakers have for engaging in policy and suggests how they can tai-
lor their approach based on their desired outcomes, intended audiences, and
their foundation’s particular style and preferences. The paper includes case
studies of four foundations——the California Endowment, the David and Lucile
Packard Foundation, the Annie E. Casey Foundation and the Lumina Foundation
for Education——and charts their policy strategies onto the framework. 
Coffman also uses the framework to present a summary of current trends in
public policy grantmaking. As depicted above, Coffman estimates that “most
grantmaking tends to fall into the area that has less perceived risk, emphasizing
strategies to raise awareness and build public will over more action-oriented
approaches.” She also sees evidence that “grantmaking tends to be more
action-oriented with public audiences than with decision makers directly.” 
This picture may be changing, however. Coffman notes that various factors
appear to be pushing grantmakers toward bolder strategies. She cites three
influences as especially powerful: leadership from innovators and early adopters
of new policy grantmaking techniques, education about legal guidelines for phil-
anthropic engagement in public policy, and advances in evaluation methods.
A
C
T
IO
N
W
IL
L
O
U
T
C
O
M
E
S
A
W
A
R
E
N
E
S
S
Community Mobilization
Community Organizing
Media Advocacy
Demonstration Programs
Policy Analysis/Research
Voter Outreach
Public Will Campaigns
Public Awareness Campaigns
Communications and Messaging
Public Polling
Advocacy Capacity Building
Public Education
Leadership Development
Litigation
Champion Development
Model Legislation 
Political Will Campaigns
Regulatory Feedback
Public Forums
Policymaker EducationInfluencer Education
Coalition Building
DECISION MAKERSINFLUENCERS
AUDIENCES
PUBLIC
T
PART 2
Navigating education
policy domains
Good education policy, whatever its particular
intent, has one core purpose: supporting stu-
dent learning by providing the right combina-
tion of pressure and support to educators,
school leaders and school system managers. It’s
through this mix of pressure and support that
policymakers hope to influence what happens
daily in schools and classrooms. The most effec-
tive policies are well attuned to the realities of
the education sector——how schools and districts
actually operate——and the myriad factors that
can enable, incentivize or inhibit change.
n the United States, the major policy
domains for K-12 education chart roughly
onto a pyramid, with policies regarding individ-
ual students at the apex and federal education
policy at the base (although the specific
domains may vary at other levels of the edu-
cation system, the same construct of nesting
domains also applies). Because our education
system is largely a decentralized one, most
education policy——and most education policy
grantmaking——is focused at the state or dis-
trict level. The effectiveness of a policy on one
tier of the policy pyramid——student, classroom,
school, district, state or federal——will almost
certainly depend on well-crafted, complemen-
tary policies at other levels. 
Complementary policies are usually designed
to produce consistency of effort: state policies
on accountability and testing, for example,
work best when they are aligned with both fed-
eral and district guidelines for school account-
ability. But, as Robert Schwartz pointed out,
complementary policies can also establish a
“better division of labor” by focusing the atten-
tion of practitioners on actions that are appro-
priately within their scope and by ensuring that
demands from one level are matched by sup-
ports and incentives from another. So, for
example, a state’s demand for improved gradu-
ation rates might be augmented by a district’s
support for more effective school-level profes-
sional learning, stronger incentives to work in
hard-to-staff schools and other initiatives. 
Recognizing the interplay across these
domains is critical for implementation, which
is the real measure of the impact of education
policy. Political scientist Richard Elmore
reminded the group of the importance of
developing a thoughtful implementation strat-
egy that takes into account the incentive
structures that drive practice at each level,
and to consider how philanthropy might influ-
ence them in positive ways.  
Institute participants explored these concepts,
looking for practical lessons for their own
grantmaking, through a discussion of a case
entitled “The Next Phase of Accountability in
North Carolina.” This case tells the story of
one state’s attempt to upgrade its existing
accountability system and reconcile it with fed-
eral No Child Left Behind (NCLB) requirements. 
When North Carolina implemented ABCs of
Public Education (ABCs) in 1996, it was one of
the most advanced state-level accountability
systems in the country. Comprehensive and
multifaceted, ABCs was associated in the minds
of many North Carolina educators and policy-
makers with a clear and rapid jump in student
performance. But after the enactment of NCLB,
it became clear that ABCs employed method-
I
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ologies that were not completely consistent
with the new federal policy’s Adequate Yearly
Progress (AYP) calculation, leading to confus-
ing results and mixed messages to schools. In
some cases, schools that did well on ABCs
measures did poorly according to AYP meas-
ures, thus negating any impetus to improve
that either system alone might inspire.
In May 2007, the North Carolina State Board
of Education appointed a Blue Ribbon
Commission on Testing and Accountability and
charged it with developing recommendations
for a redesigned statewide accountability and
testing system. The commission included rep-
resentatives from education, business and
government and heard testimony from educa-
tors, parents, and representatives of teachers’
and other professional organizations, higher
education, and business. The recommenda-
tions, offered in January 2008, emphasized
improvements to the existing system of test-
ing and accountability, greater attention to
college and workforce readiness, the inclusion
of new formative assessments, and greater
public transparency regarding school perform-
ance. The state’s Department of Public
Instruction was urged to “rethink assistance
and comprehensive support for reform” to
schools in need of improvement. 
With this information as background, Institute
participants dissected the ensuing developments
for lessons about how education grantmakers
can navigate the public policy arena effectively:
• Check for innovations that are already
addressing the problem, looking first to the
policy domains closest to your area of focus.
Having received its charge from the com-
mission, North Carolina officials began to
scan the field for robust, proven methods to
assess schools’ strengths and weaknesses
and support improvement. Of particular
interest was the Quality Review methodolo-
gy developed by the New York City school
system and the UK-based Cambridge
Education consulting group. As the officials
looked into this approach further, however,
they were surprised to learn that the second
largest school district in their own state,
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Public Schools, had
already engaged the Cambridge team,
beginning in 2006, to help design a system
capable of reconciling the ABCs and AYP
measures——the same challenge that had
inspired the formation of the Blue Ribbon
Commission. By the spring of 2008, the dis-
trict had developed a prototype system,
known as School Quality Review (SQR); con-
ducted training the previous summer; and
implemented a pilot in a handful of schools.
“It happens to us all the time” as grantmak-
ers, laughed one Institute participant: “We
have a great idea, and then we go into the
school district and discover that others have
had it too——and are already working on it!”
• Consider the incentives that motivate 
different parties; solutions take hold for
different reasons at different levels of 
the system. For state policymakers, the 
discovery that the Charlotte-Mecklenberg
district had developed a prototype quality
review system seemed like good news at
first, but they quickly recognized that it pre-
sented them with a new set of challenges.
As they considered the comparative advan-
tages of developing quality systems on par-
allel tracks or deliberately pulling the two
processes together, it became clear that it
would be difficult to produce the best possi-
ble result for both this large district and the
state because their interests were different:
the district was focused on building its
An effective policy solution would eventually
need to address the differing incentives 
motivating schools, districts and the state,
as well as those of the practitioners, leaders 
and policymakers working at each level.
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administrators’ capacity to improve schools,
while the state needed to consider varia-
tions in capacity among districts. An effec-
tive policy solution would eventually need
to address the differing incentives motivat-
ing schools, districts and the state, as well
as those of the practitioners, leaders and
policymakers working at each level. 
• Innovators are often highly motivated——
a condition that’s unlikely to prevail when
innovations are scaled systemwide.
The Charlotte-Mecklenburg pilot showed
that the SQR process was complex and
demanding and that it frequently produced
school scores significantly at odds with
ABCs and APY ratings; participating princi-
pals nonetheless gave the system high
marks because it produced findings that
mirrored their own sense of where improve-
ments were needed. SQR “created a plat-
form from which to make changes,” said
one. “It brought things to light that we
knew, but didn’t know how to address.” 
The district was pleased with the results
and began to contemplate what it would
take to implement SQRs in all 167 schools,
not just a small subset of reform-minded
volunteer schools. State officials were also
impressed with SQR but found themselves
weighing a related question: Would SQR,
which had been developed by the ambitious
and innovative Charlotte-Mecklenburg dis-
trict, translate well to districts around the
state, including those that did not place a
high value on improvement or innovation? 
• The interests of the general public——
in access to information, for example——
can get lost when they are not consistent
with the interests of even well-intentioned
public officials. The most glaring problem
revealed by the case, some participants said,
was the lack of meaningful public accounta-
bility measures in either the ABCs system 
or the new SQR system. Said one funder,
“There’s an excess of metrics here——NCLB,
ABCs, SQR, and all the end-of-course and
end-of-year assessments students are tak-
ing——but nothing that can really tell parents
if their kids are going to a good school.”
Others agreed, noting what appeared to be a
“fuzzy” connection between student results
and mandated interventions. There’s always
tension, the group agreed, between the need
for public accountability and the need for
“safe assessments” that allow students and
educators to grow and that give schools a
reliable basis for improving teaching and
learning. Strategic grantmaking might help
to resolve that tension by encouraging the
state to develop an accountability system
that provides meaningful information to the
public and strengthens community support
for school improvement.
sked to speculate about how philan-
thropy could contribute constructive-
ly in a situation like that described in the case,
Institute participants zeroed in on opportuni-
ties to support strategic communications and
research connected to specific, implementa-
tion-related challenges. As a next step, said
one, it might make sense to convene “all the
education funders in the state” to brief them
on the SQR experiment, what it might (or might
not) offer as a statewide system, and how it
could help drive instructional improvement.
Another participant suggested that funders
could support the development of “deep dive”
cases that would look closely at how the new
SQR assessments were influencing school
improvement in the Charlotte-Mecklenberg dis-
trict in the pilot and second-round schools:
“You’d want to look very close to the ground,”
she said, “to know if the review process and
findings were actually influencing conversa-
tions inside the schools on how to improve
instruction.” This kind of research could pro-
vide useful information to the state develop-
ment team, but it might be difficult for state or
district partners to commission and fund.
A
PART 3
Using research to advance
education policy reform
Philanthropy has traditionally contributed to
policy advances by supporting research and
development, yet decades of frustrating
results——projects that fail to achieve scale, don't
reach intended audiences, or don't align with
broader reform——have led many grantmakers to
turn away from R&D investments. Funders are
legitimately concerned that R&D projects are
too rarely taken up by government for systemic
expansion, no matter how meritorious, practi-
cal, or successful they may be. But funding
research remains a powerful approach that can
have profound effects on policy.
he impact of such support becomes clear
when a research project yields practical
information that lends itself readily to policy
adoption at a moment at which the field is
ready to take it up. Harvard Graduate School of
Education professor Bridget Terry Long joined
Institute participants to describe one such proj-
ect: an effort she led with coinvestigators Eric
P. Bettinger and Philip Oreopoulos to determine
how to make the Free Application for Federal
Student Aid (FAFSA) form easier to complete,
assist families in completing it, and then meas-
ure the impact on low-income students’ college
enrollment and retention (see Research back-
ground, page 16). Long’s discussion of the proj-
ect and its rapid expansion as an early policy
initiative of the Obama Administration generat-
ed a number of compelling insights about the
role of research in education grantmaking.
• A well-structured research project can
provide “proof of concept,” even without
firm impact data. The successful adminis-
tration of Long’s project demonstrated
“proof of concept” that simplifying the
FAFSA process by drawing on information
already provided on a family’s federal
income tax return could be far less burden-
some to potential students and families 
who might not otherwise access student aid
programs. In short, the case for a simplified
FAFSA was made and the case for linking
the FAFSA with the federal income tax
return was strengthened sufficiently to 
convince the Obama Administration to
make significant practical reforms in FAFSA
administration. Although definitive evidence
that those changes would close major 
leaks in the college graduation pipeline is
still lacking, this project provided “good
enough” support to be persuasive. 
• Research often generates useful insights
on how policy can best be implemented.
The research project validated the idea that
completion of the FAFSA represents an
important opportunity to provide prospec-
tive college students and their families 
with accurate, timely information about the
college application process, the likely cost
of a college education, and the availability
of financial aid. The research also uncovered
important misapprehensions and informa-
tion gaps that may inhibit students and 
their families from recognizing that college
is a desirable and attainable objective. 
For example, tax professionals involved 
with the project reported that many stu-
dents were reluctant to have the FAFSA
form filed electronically by H&R Block
because they believed that “filing ‘commit-
ted’ them to attend college” and they 
“wanted more time to think about it” or
because they had never seen a FAFSA 
form and wanted to review it before sending
it. The lesson here is that unfamiliarity, 
misunderstandings and discomfort can
inhibit participation in public programs——
even when the programs themselves are
well intended and carefully designed.
13
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The impact becomes clear when a research 
project yields practical information that lends
itself readily to policy adoption at a moment 
at which the field is ready to take it up.
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The Free Application for Federal Student
Aid (FAFSA) form serves as the basis for
awarding federal financial aid to American
college students; it is also used by most
state and institutional need-based aid pro-
grams. Research over the past decade has
found that many low-income students are
poorly informed about college costs, finan-
cial aid opportunities and the college appli-
cation process. Related research has
suggested that, because the FAFSA form
is so long and complicated to complete,
many students fail to receive financial aid
for which they are eligible. Researchers
Bridget Terry Long, Eric P. Bettinger and
Philip Oreopoulos set out to design an
intervention that would answer a decep-
tively simple question: If the FAFSA form
were easier to complete, would more low-
income students go to college? Although
their research looked specifically at the
top tier of the policy triangle——the actions
of individual students and their families 
in filling out the form and subsequent 
decisions to enroll in college——the most
immediate implications for policy change
were at the base: the federal government 
(see illustration, page 9).
The research team approached H&R Block,
a national accounting firm that provides
tax-preparation services primarily to low-
and moderate-income families and asked if
it would be willing to participate in an
experiment that would potentially provide
valuable information to its clients at rela-
tively little cost to the company. Most of
the information required for the FAFSA is
also included on a family’s tax return; the
researchers therefore believed that H&R
Block could help its clients complete the
FAFSA with only a small amount of 
additional time and effort. The company
agreed to participate.
The researchers developed a multifaceted
intervention designed to answer a series
of questions about the FAFSA itself and
about whether completing the form and
receiving associated help and information
affected students’ decisions to go to col-
lege. The researchers also collaborated
closely with H&R Block and an advisory
group to develop the required software,
establish workable protocols, train staff,
and resolve a wide range of logistical and
ethical questions that arose. 
The study focused on families that had
incomes below $45,000 and a family 
member, either a taxpayer or a dependent
child, between the ages of 14 and 30 who
did not have a bachelor’s degree. Within
those criteria were three groups of particu-
lar interest: high school seniors and recent
graduates (ages 17-21), who were deciding
about or had just entered college; young
adults (ages 22-30), who were enrolled 
in college or might enroll; and younger 
students (ages 14-17), who were preparing
for the college admissions process. 
Once an eligible participant was identified
and consent was obtained, the project
assigned the family randomly to an inter-
vention or control group. One intervention
group received assistance with completing
and submitting the FAFSA from an H&R
Block tax professional using special soft-
ware and an interview protocol; in addi-
tion, H&R Block calculated the family’s
Research background:
The FAFSA experiment
A PROJECT BY BRIDGET TERRY LONG, ERIC P. BETTINGER AND PHILIP OREOPOULOS
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estimated family contribution (EFC) and
the amount of aid the student would likely
receive at nearby public two- and four-
year colleges. Two intervention groups
received information and financial 
projections to assist them in planning 
for college, but no direct assistance with
completing the FAFSA. Control group sub-
jects received only very basic information
about the importance of college and the
availability of financial aid programs.
Working with H&R Block, the researchers
carried out a pilot project with 3,300 
families in Cleveland, Ohio, from January
through April 2007. H&R Block was
pleased with the results and agreed to
expand the service area during 2008 
and contribute financially to the project’s
continuation. Based on what they learned,
the researchers altered the study criteria
to exclude college-age students (owing 
to the difficulty of getting their informed
consent), refined the protocol, planned 
an expanded second phase and sought
additional funds. In January 2008, the
revised program was implemented in 
166 H&R Block offices in Ohio and North
Carolina. By April, the program had provid-
ed services to more than 26,000 families,
of whom 10,634 received FAFSA help,
3,463 received financial aid or estimated
family contribution information, and 
11,916 (the control group) received general
college information only.
Although the ultimate impact of the inter-
vention on college graduation will not be
known for some time, the project appears
to have affected college enrollment: 34
percent of students in the 2007 interven-
tion group enrolled in college, compared
with only 27 percent of students in the
control group. Moreover, the researchers
saw signs that the project had the greatest
impact among families at the low end of
the income scale: families earning less
than $22,000, whose typical contribution
to college costs would be zero.
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• University-based investigators can be
important players in using research to
advance education policy reform, but 
only if the institutions that employ them
recognize the import of such work. The
project’s results were rapidly taken up at
the federal level and influenced the intro-
duction of the FAFSA-EZ form in 2009. 
This was a superb result——a researcher’s
dream, Long acknowledged——yet achieving
it entailed considerable professional risk
and personal cost to the principal investiga-
tors. Presenting complex findings at hear-
ings, meetings and conferences, traveling 
to Washington DC, spending “endless
hours” providing follow-up information and
talking with journalists on the phone: these
activities take time and focus away from 
the academic writing and teaching on which
scholars like Long and her colleagues are
ultimately judged. Long reported, however,
that she had recently been awarded tenure,
owing in part to a policy at Harvard’s
Graduate School of Education to factor
“practical impact” into its tenure decisions.
Several grantmakers applauded the policy,
noting that they often feel compelled to
take policy-relevant projects to private
firms because universities tend to favor
more theoretical research. 
or grantmakers, the funding dynamics
of such research are especially note-
worthy. In this case, working in partnership
with a for-profit company raised particular
challenges, as did satisfying the requirements
of several different foundation and govern-
ment funders. Recounting the story of the
project, Long talked candidly and with some
bemusement about balancing the “demands”
of multiple funders from different sectors——the
Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, the National
Science Foundation (NSF), the Institute for
Education Sciences, the Kauffman Foundation,
the MacArthur Foundation and the Spencer
Foundation, along with H&R Block——each of
which brought its own perspectives and goals.
The Gates Foundation, for example, was main-
ly interested in designing the pilot project to
be scalable, while the NSF and the Spencer
Foundation were more interested in the
integrity of the experimental research design.
Others were interested in advocacy and influ-
encing the education policymaking infrastruc-
ture in Washington DC. 
The project’s funders also provided assistance
beyond money alone. At several key points,
funders helped the researchers find additional
funders, and they helped influence H&R
Block’s decision to maintain support for the
project even after the economic downturn
began in late 2007.
F
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In a discussion led by Kennedy School pro-
fessor Christopher Stone, the Institute par-
ticipants considered a case developed by
GFE on the Donors’ Education Collaborative
(DEC) of New York City. The collaborative
originated in 1995, when a small group of
foundation presidents charged their staffs
with developing a shared strategy to
improve the quality of education in the vast
New York City school district——a system that
at the time had roughly 1,000 schools and
1,000,000 students. 
Rather than try to influence the system
directly, the funders decided to pool their
money, seek additional foundation partners,
and embark on a strategy that combined
advocacy and community organizing. As
explained in the case study, to “spur real
improvements in the school system [in New
York City], DEC members agreed, they
should support the growth of a constituency
for reform——or, more immediately, a number
of constituencies, organized around specific
objectives and school- or neighborhood-level
needs, that might eventually merge into a
wider force.” 
Stone urged the group to consider a key
question for any collaboration: What’s the
value proposition of a funder collaborative?
DEC was successful, he noted, in keeping
foundations involved over many years and
attracting new funders——27 in all over the
collaborative’s first dozen years, with only a
handful staying with the group for less than
three years. How did the collaborative struc-
ture itself strengthen the public policy strat-
egy, and what did DEC achieve? Two salient
successes emerged:
• Wide understanding among New York
City foundations of complex, controver-
sial litigation to increase education
funding. DEC’s grantees included the
Alliance for Quality Education, which
sought to build public support for the land-
mark Campaign for Fiscal Equity (CFE)
lawsuit that had been filed in 1993 against
New York state. DEC members learned 
the ins and outs of the case and remained
supporters through the final court deci-
sion in favor of CFE in November 2006.
• Broad acceptance of community organ-
izing as a viable public policy strategy.
Membership in the collaborative enabled
many grantmakers to fund community
organizing——a technique that had enjoyed
only limited support among foundations in
the 1990s. DEC made a large number of
multiyear grants to key community organ-
izing groups, thus helping to establish the
relatively new field of education organiz-
ing in New York’s immigrant, low-income
and minority communities. As an Institute
participant who was also a longtime DEC
member explained, “Some of us believed
strongly that people from the neighbor-
hoods should speak for themselves——that
was our policy agenda. You need a long-
term funding infrastructure to support
community organizing. It takes multiple
years. And we provided that.”
Funder collaboratives combine funders’
resources and distribute risk. They can
therefore be very helpful mechanisms for
letting foundations experiment with funding
strategies——like community organizing or
public policy advocacy——that are unfamiliar
and perceived as exposing the foundation
(or the individual grantmaker) to unwelcome
public attention. 
Funding collaboratively to build public will 
LESSONS FROM THE DONORS’ EDUCATION COLLABORATIVE
PART 4
Policy entrepreneurship
and philanthropy
Policy formation is an entrepreneurial enter-
prise, one in which strategic grantmaking
often depends on being poised to capitalize on
opportunities as they arise. For many funders,
this means identifying and supporting “policy
entrepreneurs” who are working over the long
term on issues that matter to the foundation.
Some grantmakers take up the role of policy
entrepreneur themselves, establish new enti-
ties or pull together allies to press for change. 
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hen a grantmaker becomes involved
in policy development, the ideal
outcome is to advance policy on an issue
that’s at the heart of the foundation’s pro-
gram priorities and mission. Such shifts tend
to happen, political scientist Richard Elmore
observed during one Institute session, when
policy entrepreneurs see an opportunity for
change and put “institutional weight” behind
making it happen. “There are problems out
there in search of solutions, and solutions in
search of problems,” he explained, citing John
W. Kingdon’s Agendas, Alternatives, and Public
Policy (1984). Policy entrepreneurs capitalize
on events that bring problems and solutions
into alignment—often in ways that enable the
formation of new coalitions.
Institute participants considered philanthropy’s
place in public policy formation and implementa-
tion as they discussed a case study concerning
Early Education for All (EE4A), a foundation-
funded initiative to expand early education pro-
grams that began in Massachusetts in 1998. The
case recounts the history of the EE4A campaign
and details a step-by-step strategy developed by
campaign organizer Margaret Blood in collabo-
ration with the initiative’s original funder, the
Caroline and Sigmund Schott Foundation:
• Create and develop an independent, non-
partisan organization to run the campaign.
• Use research to make the case.
• Include diverse allies at top levels 
of the effort.
• Mobilize a grassroots community.
• Outreach through messaging and 
the media.
• Translate public support into legislation 
and policy.
In a lively discussion that included Blood and
several EE4A funders, the group uncovered
specific lessons about the role of philanthropy,
and of philanthropic coalitions, in public policy
entrepreneurship:
• To establish a broad base of well-informed
supporters, get additional funders involved
with the initial research and message
development. Initially managed from within
the Schott Foundation, the campaign recruit-
ed additional funders to support the early
research, including extensive voter polling
and opinion leader interviews to gauge 
the level of support for early childhood 
services. The funders became a cohort of
well-informed, committed supporters of the
campaign and its mission. Representatives
from five sponsoring foundations participat-
ed throughout the campaign as members 
of a multisector advisory committee that
worked to craft a unified message. 
• Make sure funders stay well informed 
and prepared for action. “Our bread and 
butter and what we survive on is communica-
tion,” Blood explained. “It is our biggest 
challenge and some of the hardest work we
do because we want to keep our funders as
engaged as we do the legislature and the
6,000 people in our database.” Over time,
funders and other members of the advisory
committee lent crucial support by signing 
op-eds for local newspapers, reaching out to
community leaders and helping business lead-
ers understand the economic value of state
investment in early childhood education. 
• Seek new funders, and recognize that
some funders’ priorities will change. Over
W
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the course of the campaign, several new fun-
ders have joined the ranks while others have
left. In one case, the Irene E. and George A.
Davis Foundation, one of the campaign’s
early supporters and strategic partners,
shifted its support away from the campaign
to focus on implementation considerations.
The foundation is now spearheading an
effort to provide full-scale early education
programs in one locality, Springfield, as the
logical next step to secure the campaign’s
ultimate goals. 
• In addition to legislation, focus on building
public support and establishing infrastruc-
ture. In 2002, An Act Establishing Early
Education for All began to work its way
through the Massachusetts state legislature.
It eventually passed and was signed into law
by a new governor in July 2008. In the inter-
vening years, the campaign focused on build-
ing popular support and crafting related
policies——such as the creation of a state
agency to provide a unified system of gover-
nance for early childhood service provision——
sometimes over the active opposition of the
then governor. The campaign also continued
to build the case for universal early educa-
tion by supporting cost analyses, a pilot pro-
gram, a scholarship program, and systems to
improve the early childhood workforce and
assess service quality——steps designed to
satisfy public concerns and strengthen the
base of support. 
s they discussed the case, Institute
participants emphasized repeatedly
that a successful campaign depends enormously
on having a leader who can hold the members of
a coalition——including funders—— together to
achieve its goals. Blood was “very clear about
what she thought,” noted one participant, and
she led the group forcefully toward consensus.
“Dynamic, passionate, credible and trustwor-
thy,” Blood understood that a successful coali-
tion has to transcend narrow interests and
address challenges, such as potential costs and
governance arrangements, that might serve as
stumbling blocks to passage and implementa-
tion, or that might keep essential constituencies
from signing on. Legislators, business and com-
munity leaders, day-care workers and owners,
advocates, and parents all knew where Blood
stood, recognized the depth of her knowledge
and understood that she was wiling to listen: “If
people think you have a hidden agenda,” one
person noted, “then it just won’t work.” 
It takes tremendous skill, Elmore agreed, “to
bring a wide range of different players into a
campaign” and hold them together firmly
enough to act decisively when the time is right.
EE4A promised broad benefits——services for all
children, not just those in low-income families,
of a quality high enough to satisfy middle-
income families and paid for by all the taxpay-
ers in the state——and stuck to its guns, thus
making it possible to hold the coalition togeth-
er and expand it over time. 
In addition to providing financial backing, the
funders gave real support to both the leader
and the coalition by participating actively in the
campaign’s advisory committee, using their
influence with statewide and local constituen-
cies, and supporting research that made a com-
pelling case for the educational value and
cost-effectiveness of high-quality services.
Their long-term support helped to uphold the
integrity of the campaign and keep it on track,
with a workable mix of steadiness and flexibili-
ty, over the course of an entire decade until,
A
Successful implementation often 
depends on a foundation’s ability to apply 
steady pressure and leverage change 
in a system reluctant to shift its practice.
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finally, the right combination of opportunities
came together.
This entrepreneurial coalition gave traction
and sustainability during a significant yet often
overlooked stage of the process: implementa-
tion. “Policy formation is only 20 percent of
the work,” Elmore observed, “the rest is imple-
mentation.” Successful implementation often
depends on a foundation’s ability to apply
steady pressure and leverage change in a sys-
tem reluctant to shift its practice. Indeed, once
the initial implementation is done, funders are
likely to recognize a new need: scaling. As one
seasoned grantmaker noted, “We in philanthro-
py have too often been guilty of a ‘prairie fire’
approach, assuming that good work will scale
itself. We need to think instead about what
incentives will cause the work to take hold.”
More than money:
Applying leverage
Funders use much more than money to advance policy
change. A grantmaker might bring steady pressure to
bear over a long period, trying to provide evidence, 
lend credibility and build momentum behind a good idea.
Alternately, a funder might make an energetic push at 
a crucial moment. As independent institutions, founda-
tions are also free to make strategic choices about the
stances they choose to take: it often makes sense to 
be constructive and helpful, faculty member Richard
Elmore said, but sometimes the situation demands a
“constructive irritant.” Be willing to think of yourself as
a “burr under the saddle” of slow-to-change government
actors, he urged, or the “grain of sand in the oyster”
around which a nugget of new practice takes shape.
Over the course of the Institute, participants named a
wide range of strategies funders can use to bring added
“leverage” to a push for a new policy or its effective
implementation:
• Develop and validate “existence proofs” that show
that new practices are feasible and effective.
• Conduct research to uncover reasons why people or
institutions resist worthwhile change; support inter-
ventions, such as community organizing, that alter
the equation and make resistance more costly.
• Generate data that clarifies the scope of a problem
and makes the case for change.
• Engage interested parties——schools, colleges, busi-
nesses, or other relevant institutions——in designing a
model and participating in its continuing evolution.
• Build coalitions to support new and expanding work.
• Provide “gap” funding that lets the developers of
government-funded programs work more thoughtfully.
• Help partners understand philanthropy’s role
beyond “just giving them the money” so they can use
a foundation’s support more strategically.
• Step up personal involvement in policy discussions 
to raise the stakes for public officials.
• Bring supporters together to advance policy
change; strive to keep the coalition together to 
monitor implementation.
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PART 5
Evaluating public policy grantmaking
Evaluation and accountability are never far
from grantmakers’ minds. Thoughtful articula-
tion of strategic goals, objectives, measures
and outcomes bears particular weight when
funders are engaging with public policy.
n an exercise led by Bob Behn, lecturer
at the Kennedy School of Government,
Institute participants developed an evaluation
strategy for an education initiative by a hypo-
thetical foundation in the fictional state of
West Dakota and drew some quick lessons
about evaluation generally:
• Pick a starting point. The starting point for
the discussion was a one-page “case study”
outlining a hypothetical foundation’s three
major (and, to many participants, absurdly
ambitious and sketchily described) policy
goals. This brought the group to lesson
number one: “No matter how much detail is
provided in a case,” Behn said, “people ask
for more data before they’re willing to make
a decision.” The key to exploring an evalua-
tion strategy, whether in real life or when
the process is only an exercise, is to choose
something to investigate and start figuring
out what you might learn and how to go
about doing it. 
• Tie evaluation to the foundation’s core
goals and strategies. To evaluate the effec-
tiveness of a funder’s public policy strategy,
it’s important to understand why the foun-
dation’s decision makers——board, leadership
and program staff——have identified certain
public policy changes as important and
“what measurable aspects they have in
mind.” This sort of understanding is also
crucial in order to “communicate the 
funder’s vision” for a better educational
system publicly, participants said. To focus
the conversation, the group selected “all
children enter kindergarten ready to learn”
as the hypothetical goal and mapped an
advocacy strategy that would depend large-
ly on advocacy aimed at enacting legislation
to increase the supply of high-quality pre-
school “slots” and make them more avail-
able to children from low-income families.
• Gather baseline data on what exists now
and a clear description of what could
change, why that change would matter 
and how it could be measured. Before 
starting to pursue its policy goal, the hypo-
thetical foundation would need to have 
a thorough picture of its state’s existing 
system for accrediting preschool programs
and teachers, as well as precise information
on how many centers and teachers are
accredited, how many slots are available,
and what funding is available to help 
low-income families access those slots. 
• Articulate expected long-term and inter-
mediate outcomes and plot them onto 
a logic model. The group identified four
general, measurable outcomes that could
be tracked over time: number of accredited
preschool centers, number of certified
teachers, number of slots available and
number of slots held by children from low-
income families. To narrow their strategic
thinking even further, the group chose to
hypothesize that a shortage of certified 
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The most relevant measurable outcomes 
are meaningful both to the funders 
and to the officials on whose support 
policy change depends.
preschool teachers was a crucial limiting
factor in the state’s ability to provide high-
quality preschool programs to all children. 
• Consider public officials’ perspectives and
the incentives that motivate them. Behn
urged the importance of considering the
perspectives of the governor’s office, the
state legislature and the state department
of education——and of asking consistently
what steps would seem plausible to them,
what evidence would be persuasive and
what might incentivize them to advance
change. The most relevant measurable 
outcomes, he argued, are meaningful both
to the funders and to the officials on whose
support policy change depends.
ot surprisingly, the logic model and
prospective outcomes led the group
to consider how a grantmaker might get a pic-
ture of even more fundamental, long-term out-
comes——such as high school graduation rates,
college enrollment and retention, even years of
healthy life and total life expectancy in their
state——and how those might be affected by
greater access to high-quality preschool and
greater readiness to learn among children
reaching kindergarten. 
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Interim Interim Interim Interim
Foundation Objective Objective Objective Objective Measurable
Strategy Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Outcome
Accredited 
preschool
centers
established
Preschool Certified
teacher preschool
certification teachers
organization available
established for hire
Fund Legislation State education Scholarship Higher Preschool
advocacy and funding department funding for education slots
authorization sub-unit preschool training available
established teacher training programs
established
Funding to Preschool Preschool
subsidize voucher slots filled by
preschool for program children from
low-income in place low-income
families families
Honing evaluation to be comparative,
measurable and meaningful is a critical piece 
of this work, one that funders must undertake as
thoughtfully as any other part of the process.
N
Bob Behn’s Public 
Management Report
Behn grounded the conversation in a 
one-page reading from his monthly Public
Management Report series: “Compared 
with What?,” a short essay on why every
evaluation must begin with that question.
Read the essay or register for a free 
subscription at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/
thebehnreport/.
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Behn left participants with this important
thought: measurement is meaningful only when
you’re able to answer the question “Compared
with what?” This question is at the heart of
evaluation. “Every step of the above model
should be compared with something,” he noted,
“and factors such as speed and quality need to
be taken into consideration.” The number of
preschool slots might grow, but is it growing
fast enough, and is the quality of services suffi-
cient? “One basis of comparison might be
‘What would have happened if we had done
nothing?” he suggested. But that may not satis-
fy a rigorous foundation board. Honing evalua-
tion to be comparative, measurable and
meaningful is a critical piece of this work, one
that funders must undertake as thoughtfully as
any other part of the process. 
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Conclusion
Although policy grantmaking is highly complex,
it is an essential tool for education grantmak-
ers seeking to leverage their investments to
improve education outcomes. 
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s GFE’s executive director Chris
Tebben emphasized in her closing
remarks, the discussions that took place at the
Education Grantmakers Institute yielded les-
sons that were both daunting and reassuring:
• Public policy grantmaking can require 
new ways of working, and the assumption
of new risks. Grantmakers interested in
advancing policy change should bear in
mind that doing so entails activities,
grantees and perhaps even public scrutiny
that may be unfamiliar to board members
accustomed to more traditional forms of
grantmaking. Foundation boards need
opportunities to consider the risks and
rewards of public policy grantmaking and
how it can advance the mission and goals 
of their institution. 
• Public policy grantmaking is broader than
we think it is. Policy is everywhere, not just
in the work of legislators and public offi-
cials. As both the ETS and the H&R Block
examples illustrate, an amazing range of
funded activities can have policy implica-
tions. We can influence policy by making
common cause with unlikely actors and by
using unconventional methods.
• Policies often change because incentive
structures shift. Philanthropy can often
make a difference through strategic grant-
making that encourages people at different
levels of the educational system to inno-
vate, adopt more effective practices or
apply more rigorous standards to their
work. As different players——with different
concerns and goals——work together, funders
can have a key role in leveraging policy
change by keeping a focus on the broad
public interest.
• Clear goals are important——for 
philanthropy and the public. Foundations
need well-articulated and measurable goals
in order to maximize the value of their
investments, evaluate their work, and 
communicate their goals and values to 
policy audiences and the wider public.
• The work isn’t done when a new policy is
adopted. Policy enactment is only the first
step toward the ultimate impacts funders
seek. To ensure good implementation, 
follow-through is important. In fact, some
grantmakers make important contributions
by focusing exclusively on the implementa-
tion and sustainability of promising new
policies——a challenge that includes maintain-
ing public pressure to ensure implementa-
tion is properly funded.
• Persistence remains a fundamental 
principle for effective education policy
grantmaking. Given the lengthy timeline 
for advancing policy changes, which
extends still further when we include 
successful implementation after policy
enactment, funders must bring patience,
humility and tenacity to this work.
Ultimately, the opportunities for high-
impact outcomes when engaging policy 
are so great, we need to marshal the 
persistence to achieve them.
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Discipline and Focus 
In education, where public dollars dwarf private investments, a funder
has greater impact when grantmaking is carefully planned and targeted.
Knowledge
Information, ideas and advice from diverse sources, as well as openness 
to criticism and feedback, can help a funder make wise choices.
Resources Linked to Results 
A logic-driven “theory of change” helps a grantmaker think clearly 
about how specific actions will lead to desired outcomes, thus linking
resources with results.
Effective Grantees 
A grantmaker is effective only when its grantees are effective. 
Especially in education, schools and systems lack capacity and grantees
(both inside and outside the system) may require deeper support.
Engaged Partners 
A funder succeeds by actively engaging its partners——the individuals,
institutions and communities connected with an issue——to ensure 
“ownership” of education problems and their solutions.
Leverage, Influence and Collaboration 
The depth and range of problems in education make it difficult to 
achieve meaningful change in isolation or by funding programs without
changing public policies or opinions. A grantmaker is more effective
when working with others to mobilize and deploy as many resources 
as possible in order to advance solutions.
Persistence 
The most important problems in education are often the most complex
and intractable, and will take time to solve.
Innovation and Constant Learning 
Even while acting on the best available information——as in Principle #2——
a grantmaker can create new knowledge about ways to promote 
educational success. Tracking outcomes, understanding costs and 
identifying what works——and what doesn’t——are essential to helping
grantmakers and their partners achieve results.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
PRINCIPLES FOR
Effective Education Grantmaking
principle 
no.
principle 
no.
principle 
no.
principle 
no.
principle 
no.
principle 
no.
principle 
no.
principle 
no.
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